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ABSTRACT 
The New Horizons (NH) spacecraft was 
launched in January 2006 aboard an Atlas V 
launch vehicle, in a mission to explore Pluto, its 
moons, and other bodies in the Kuiper Belt.  The 
NH spacecraft is powered by a Radioisotope 
Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) which encases 
multiple General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) 
modules.  Thus, a pre-launch vehicle breakup 
analysis for an inadvertent atmospheric reentry 
in the event of a launch failure was required to 
assess aerospace nuclear safety and for launch 
contingency planning.  This paper addresses 
potential accidental Earth reentries analyzed at 
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) which may 
arise during the ascent to parking orbit, resulting 
in a suborbital reentry, as well as a departure 
from parking orbit, resulting in an orbital 
reentry. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The New Horizons (NH) spacecraft (see Fig. 1) 
was launched in January 2006 aboard an Atlas V 
launch vehicle, in a mission to explore Pluto, its 
moons, and other bodies in the Kuiper Belt.  The 
NH spacecraft is powered by a Radioisotope 
Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) which encases 
multiple General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) 
modules.  Thus, a pre-launch vehicle breakup 
analysis for an inadvertent atmospheric reentry 
in the event of a launch failure was required to 
assess aerospace nuclear safety and for launch 
contingency planning.  This paper addresses 
potential accidental Earth reentries analyzed at 
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) which may 
arise during the ascent to parking orbit, resulting 
in a suborbital reentry, as well as a departure 
from parking orbit, resulting in an orbital 
reentry.   
 
High Gain 
Antenna 
RTG 
Figure 1.  The New Horizons Spacecraft 
The suborbital reentries consisted of launch 
failure scenarios leading to the activation of the 
Flight Termination System at various times 
during ascent, resulting in ballistic fallback 
trajectories.  For orbital reentries, the V-Gamma 
Map consisting of the envelope of possible entry 
speed (V) and entry flight path angle (gamma) 
pairs was generated based on the assumption of 
steady misaligned burns (SMB) while in the 
parking orbit.  Points about the V-Gamma Map 
as reentry conditions were analyzed, including 
delayed elliptic where the vehicle reenters the 
atmosphere after passing through an apogee; 
prompt elliptic where the vehicle is on a 
downward path at the end of the burns, 
approaching a perigee within the atmosphere; 
powered reentry which occurs while the burns 
are in progress; and circular orbit decay (COD) 
due to failed burns in the parking orbit.  The 
potential launch failure scenarios leading to these 
suborbital and orbital reentries were selected as 
representative and bounding cases.  Additional 
cases were analyzed to ensure that all potential 
accident initial conditions (AIC) that were major 
contributors to accident outcome conditions 
(AOC) where the RTG experiences a potentially 
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 damaging environment were addressed to deliver 
a complete reentry breakup analysis.  The AICs 
were identified in the accident sequence analysis 
and progressed logically to various AOCs 
through Event Sequence Diagrams.  These 
additional major contributor failure scenarios 
included Liquid Rocket Engine (LRE) 
catastrophic launch failures and 
trajectory/attitude control malfunction prior to 
Earth escape leading to accidental Earth reentry. 
The heating rate, integrated heating, and g-
loading for the reentry trajectories were 
computed to assess the potential breakup of the 
RTG housing and the release of the GPHS 
modules using integrated heating/g-load failure 
criteria.  The RTG could be shielded from 
aerodynamic heating during the reentry by the 
spacecraft bus and High Gain Antenna (HGA).  
In powered reentry, the Stage III Star 48B motor 
could also shield the RTG from heating. 
Finally, a contingency plan was developed for 
day-of-launch failure operations in which the 
expected footprint of the RTG/GPHS modules 
on the surface of the Earth was determined.  
2. V-GAMMA MAP 
Based on inputs obtained from [1] including the 
burn and coast durations and spacecraft masses 
while in the parking orbit, a V-gamma map for 
the SMB was developed as shown in Fig. 2 for 
the purpose of comparing similar SMB 
categories and exploring the boundary of reentry 
parameters.  The thrust misalignment in the SMB 
is defined in terms of the cone and clock angles 
of a sphere.  The cone angle is measured in the 
yaw plane with 0 deg as the nominal burn.  The 
clock angle is about the roll axis with 90 deg for 
a vertically upward thrust.  Fig. 3 shows the 
relative probabilities for the 5 main categories of 
outcome:  powered entry (PWE), hyperbolic 
escape (HES), prompt elliptic (ELP), elliptic 
delayed (ELD), and decay of ellipse (DEL).  The 
vehicle in a PWE enters the atmosphere with the 
engine/motor still burning.  In a HES, the vehicle 
escapes from the gravitation of the planet at 
hyperbolic speed.  The vehicle in an ELP 
proceeds with a downward velocity and enters 
the atmosphere prior to the apogee.  In the ELD, 
the vehicle passes the apogee before entering the 
atmosphere near the perigee.  In addition, there is 
a category representing a failure to burn, which 
results in the decay of the parking orbit and ends 
in a reentry from circular orbit decay (COD).  
Circular orbit decay is also the end point of the 
DEL category.  The relative probabilities of the 
categories presented in Fig. 3 are limited by the 
assumption of a SMB.  The comparison of this 
mission with the Mars Exploration Rover-A 
(MER-A) and Pathfinder missions for SMBs is 
given in Tab. 1. 
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Figure 2.  V-Gamma Map for the NH Mission 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Relative Probabilities for the NH 
mission 
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 Table 1.  Percentages for the Steady Misaligned 
Burn 
 
 Percentages 
Category NH MER-A Pathfinder 
Powered 
Entry 
49.0 38.71 38.92 
Prompt 
Elliptic 
1.0 5.82 5.76 
Delayed 
Elliptic 
18.0 41.11 38.81 
Decay of 
Ellipse 
1.0 7.57 5.88 
Hyperbolic 
Escape 
31.0 6.79 10.44 
 
It can be seen that the percentage for hyperbolic 
escape is higher for NH, consistent with the 
higher launch energy.  It is noted that the prompt 
elliptic cases include some that are hyperbolic, 
where the vehicle passes through the atmosphere 
at the end of the burn and possibly performs a 
multiple-skip entry.  Also, the decay of ellipse 
cases probably reenter as decay of circular orbit, 
similar to the cases of incomplete burn that leave 
the vehicle in orbit in vacuum. 
For powered reentries, the entry angle-of-attack 
(AOA) of the vehicle centerline relative to the 
airflow at 120 km altitude, the reentry altitude, is 
not random as shown in Fig. 4.  The entry time 
measured from the start of the Centaur second 
burn is given in Fig. 5.  Powered reentry can 
occur as early as near 134 sec during the Centaur 
second burn, as well as during the coast and the 
STAR 48B burn with appropriate mass and 
thrust accounted for.  The non-powered reentries 
can occur after the STAR 48B burn or after the 
staging of the STAR 48B motor. 
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Figure 4.  Powered Entry Angle-of-Attack 
Contours 
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Figure 5.  Contours of Powered Entry Times 
Measured from Start of Second Centaur Burn  
 
 
3. FAILURE CRITERIA 
 
In prior analyses for the Cassini mission [2], 
failure criteria for the RTG, i.e., release of the 
GPHS modules, were defined as a function of 
the allowable load (g-load) and integrated 
reference heating (Qref).  The Cassini single 
lumped-mass model of the RTG was derived 
from the Galileo multiple node thermal/structural 
RTG model.  The Cassini model as shown in 
Fig. 6 was used in the NH breakup analysis for 
RTG failure assessment.  For the spacecraft-RTG 
attachment, the corresponding failure criteria 
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 based on a reference 1-ft nose radius cylinder 
were: 
 Qref  = 15684 J/cm2
 g-load = 33 g 
This indicates that the RTG case will fail before 
the attachment.  The time integral of the 
stagnation point heating for HGA failure is 214 
J/cm2.   
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Figure 6.  RTG Failure Criteria Based on a 
Reference 1-ft Nose Radius Cylinder 
4. POINTS ABOUT THE V-GAMMA MAP 
ORBITAL REENTRIES 
Entry trajectories have been evaluated for a 
number of points about the V-gamma map.  
These points are characterized by the vehicle 
configuration, thrust misalignment, and 
associated entry condition that determines the 
type of reentry.  The entry vehicle may be the 
separated spacecraft or the spacecraft attached to 
the empty STAR 48B motor.  The entry 
condition at 120 km consists of the angle-of-
attack, inertial velocity, and inertial flight path 
angle (FPA).  The powered reentry cases are 
discussed in detail later in Sec. 4.1. 
In the circular orbit decay entry which results 
from an incomplete burn, including no burn of 
both of the second Centaur burn and STAR 48B 
burn, it is assumed that the staging and 
separation have proceeded as planned, so that the 
entry vehicle is the spacecraft alone.  The entry 
is random around the Earth, and thus so is the 
angle-of-attack.  In this section, the STAR 48B 
failure to ignite is not considered.  The Atlas 
second Centaur burn gives the spacecraft the 
escape velocity it needs to escape the Earth and 
inserts it into a heliocentric orbit.  The STAR 
48B burn provides the needed extra speed to get 
to Pluto. 
In this analysis, only the ballistic coefficient of a 
tumbling spacecraft at Mach 10 has been 
considered to represent the prompt elliptic, the 
delayed elliptic, and the circular orbit decay 
types of reentry.  The ballistic coefficient, 
m/CDA, is 68.7 kg/m2, where the mass (m) is 465 
kg; the drag coefficient (CD) is 1.82; and the 
reference area (A) is 3.72 m2. 
The entry conditions for 14 cases of orbital 
reentry are given in Tab. 2.  The table also shows 
the values of the cone angle A and the clock 
angle B, relative to the initial direction of the 
velocity in the intermediate parking orbit, and 
the angle-of-attack at entry.  These 14 points 
represent the outer boundary of the V-gamma 
map and are the cardinal points intended to 
bound the orbital reentry scenarios.  The 
corresponding peak reference stagnation point 
convective heating, its time integral, and the 
peak g-load are given in Tab. 3.   
Comparing the maximum heating and g-load 
calculated for each point to the failure criteria 
shown in Fig. 6, it is concluded that the RTG 
would fail and release the GPHS modules for 
points 1, 2, and 5 – 14 since the combined g-load 
and maximum heating exceeded the allowable 
limits.  The RTG would not break up, however, 
for points 3 and 4. 
 
Table 2.  Entry Conditions of Points About the V-
Gamma Map 
 
Point Cone 
Angle 
(deg) 
Clock 
Angle 
(deg) 
Angle 
of 
Attack 
(deg) 
Inertial
Entry 
Speed 
(km/s) 
Inertial 
Entry 
FPA 
(deg) 
1 124 90 110 4.2 -81.92 
2 134 90 86 2.83 -67.62 
3 142 90 57 1.93 -48.93 
4 140 70 63 2.69 -32.51 
5 136 50 63 4.25 -15.15 
6 126 30 59 6.58 -5.5 
7 90 20 49 10.96 -14.53 
8 82 40 62 10.89 -33.48 
9 74 70 75 10.96 -54.87 
10 80 90 98 10.1 -64.71 
11 100 90 127 7.56 -77.69 
12 - - - 7.77 -0.25 
13 146 80 150 2.53 -30.69 
14 142 60 115 2.99 -25.44 
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 Table 3.  Trajectory Parameters for Points About 
the V-Gamma Map 
 
Point Type Max 
heating 
rate 
(W/cm2) 
Integrate
d 
Heating* 
(J/cm2) 
Max g-
load 
(g’s) 
1 ELD 46.9 507.8 50.2 
2 ELD 14.4 220 23.5 
3 ELP 4.7 94.6 11.2 
4 ELP 8.6 200.2 13.4 
5 ELP 22.2 721.6 15.2 
6 ELP 54.7 2970 13.7 
7 ELD 362.0 6726.6 65.3 
8 ELD 537.9 4424.9 155.6 
9 ELD 688.9 3774.9 254.9 
10 ELD 562.6 3079.7 241.7 
11 ELD 255.5 1653.3 159.8 
12 COD 42.4 10090 6.7 
13 PWE 103.0 1155.6 174.4 
14 PWE 150.0 1035.5 72.1 
* Based on a reference 1-m nose radius sphere 
 
The maximum heating rate and maximum g-load 
do not occur at the same time or altitude for any 
of the trajectories presented above.  The 
conditions at which the failure criteria are 
exceeded are shown in Tab. 4.  The times of 
failure vary significantly for various steep entries 
and COD. 
    
Table 4.  Conditions at Failure of RTG Case in 
Orbital Reentries 
 
Cas
e 
Tim
e 
Fro
m 
Entr
y 
(sec) 
Altitu
de 
(km) 
Integrat
ed 
Heating
* 
(J/cm2) 
g-
loa
d 
(g) 
1 19 40.65 267.7 24.
1 
2 33 32.96 170.8 19.
9 
3 - -  -  -  
4 -  -  -  -  
5 59 61.89 466.3 10.
7 
6 72 84.95 756.3 2.1 
7 18 87.58 827.7 3.4 
8 10 77.96 911.2 16.
0 
9 7 75.15 790.6 23.
Cas
e 
Tim
e 
Fro
m 
Entr
y 
(sec) 
Altitu
de 
(km) 
Integrat
ed 
Heating
* 
(J/cm2) 
g-
loa
d 
(g) 
1 
10 7 74.27 668.1 23.
0 
11 9 60.73 410.1 17.
6 
12 442 112.03 786.0 0.0 
13 52 19.55 1093.6 20.
8 
14 46 34.62 750.4 7.2 
* Based on a reference 1-m nose radius sphere 
 
The g-load was computed based on the 
normalized non-gravitational perturbing 
acceleration. The centrifugal and Coriolis 
accelerations due to the rotation of the Earth 
were considered in the trajectory propagation, 
but not in the calculation of the aerodynamic g-
load. 
The indication from these 14 points in Tab. 4 is 
that the RTG does not fail in approximately 
14.3% of the orbital reentries considered (prompt 
elliptic, delayed elliptic SMB cases, decay of 
circular orbit, and powered entries).  In entries 
where the RTG fails, the GPHS modules are 
released at altitudes covering a range of 20 – 112 
km depending on the large range of entry speeds 
and flight path angles of the V and gamma entry 
cases. 
For an Earth reentry at about -0.25 deg flight 
path angle and near the circular orbit speed of 
7.8 km/s at 125 km altitude with Earth rotation 
downwind at latitude 28 deg (408 m/s), the 
integrated heating is 10,090 J/cm2 based on a 
reference 1-m nose radius sphere.  The RTG is 
expected to break up since the integrated heating 
far exceeds the maximum allowable heating.  
This circular orbit decay condition represents the 
most likely launch vehicle failure.  For additional 
reentry configurations consistent with the major 
failure contributors to the orbital reentry AOC, 
refer to the Orb1 through Orb4 cases in Sec. 6. 
4.1. Powered Reentries 
For powered reentries, two cases were simulated 
where the entry occurs during the STAR 48B 
burn.  The vehicle configuration at entry is the 
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 spacecraft with the STAR 48B motor, spin table, 
and adapter.  The entry mass depends on the fuel 
remaining at the time of entry, and the vehicle 
orientation at entry is specified by the entry 
angle-of-attack.  The spacecraft is assumed to 
tumble following the STAR 48B staging/failure 
due to aerodynamic instability. 
At an entry angle-of-attack of 0º with the 
spacecraft facing the flow, the STAR 48B motor 
case will not receive enough heating to play a 
part in the breakup before the RTG fails.  At an 
entry angle-of-attack of 180º with the nozzle 
facing the flow, there is essentially no failure 
until the motor burn ceases, as the exhaust 
pressure greatly exceeds the stagnation pressure 
of the flow.  Thus, in both scenarios of face-on 
and end-on entries, the end of burn and 
separation of the STAR 48B is assumed to occur 
at the nominal times.  In a side-on entry at an 
entry angle-of-attack of 90º, the STAR 48B 
failure is assumed to occur at 608 J/cm2, 
referenced to a 1-m nose radius sphere, and for 
an intermediate entry angle-of-attack, the failure 
integrated heating for the STAR 48B is an 
inverse function of the sine of the angle-of-
attack.  The entry vehicle characteristics for the 
two cases of powered entry are given in Tab. 5. 
 
Table 5.  Entry Vehicle in Powered Entries 
 
C
as
e 
M
as
s 
(k
g) 
C
D
A
ref 
(
m
2) 
Ballis
tic 
Coeff
icient 
(kg/m
2) 
STA
R 
48B 
Failu
re 
Integ
rated 
Heati
ng* 
(J/cm
2) 
1 26
90 
0.
1
8 
10
.5 
1423 1226 
2 22
87 
0.
0
8 
10
.5 
2682 673 
* Based on a reference 1-m nose radius sphere 
In the first powered reentry case where the entry 
angle-of-attack is 150º, the vehicle is flying 
almost end-on.  Thus, the spacecraft is shielded 
from aerodynamic heating by the plume from the 
burning STAR 48B, and the RTG failure is 
based on g-load only.  In the second powered 
entry case where the entry angle-of-attack is 
115º, the vehicle is flying approximately side-on 
and spinning.  Thus, the RTG and HGA failures 
are evaluated based on combined g-load and 
integrated heating.  In both powered reentry 
cases, the RTG fails, and the GPHS modules are 
released (see powered entry cases 13 and 14 in 
Tab. 2 and 3 for trajectory parameters and in 
Tab. 4 for conditions at failure of RTG case). 
5. SUBORBITAL BALLISTIC 
FALLBACK TRAJECTORIES 
In this section a number of ballistic fallback 
trajectories from a nominal ascent trajectory ([3] 
and [4]) prior to reaching the parking orbit is 
investigated.  Tab. 6 gives the time, altitude, 
velocity, and flight path angle at the cessation of 
thrust during ascent.  The peak stagnation point 
reference heating, its time integral, and the peak 
g-load in Tab. 7 are quantified to determine if it 
is likely that the RTG breaks up or separates 
from the spacecraft prior to surface impact.  This 
is not a complete breakup analysis, but rather a 
quick analysis based on the heating time integral 
and maximum g-load. 
In this failure scenario, the activation of the 
Flight Termination System (FTS) including the 
Breakup System (BUS) following thrust 
cessation is assumed, resulting in a tumbling 
spacecraft as the reentry vehicle.  Note that this 
configuration became inapplicable after a 
contingency procedure was added to disable the 
BUS at 40 sec MET, resulting in a tumbling S/C 
+ an almost intact STAR 48B with nearly all of 
the solid propellant as the reentry vehicle.  
However, the result of the suborbital reentry 
cases that are no longer relevant is not updated 
since the prediction of the RTG failure is 
assumed not to change significantly by changing 
the reentry configuration.  This assumption is 
made considering that the addition of the almost 
intact STAR 48B to the tumbling entry vehicle 
does not significantly change the exposure of the 
RTG case to the flow.  For additional reentry 
configurations consistent with the major failure 
contributors to the suborbital reentry AOC, refer 
to the Sub1 through Sub3 cases in Sec. 6. 
 
Table 6.  Initial Conditions of Ballistic Fallback 
Trajectories 
 
Case Time of 
Thrust 
Cessation 
Altitude 
(km) 
Inertial 
Velocity 
(m/s) 
Inertial 
FPA 
(deg) 
  6
 From 
Launch (sec) 
1 100.00 41.01 1333 34.88 
2 150.00 78.38 2082 19.95 
3 200.00 111.77 3176 11.16 
4 250.00 140.18 5048 6.22 
5 300.00 165.29 5963 4.18 
6 350.00 183.71 6133 2.85 
7 400.00 196.08 6322 1.75 
8 450.00 203.34 6530 0.89 
9 500.00 206.52 6754 0.26 
10 520.00 206.90 6849 0.07 
11 540.00 206.87 6946 -0.08 
12 560.00 206.53 7046 -0.20 
13 580.00 205.94 7148 -0.27 
14 600.00 205.19 7253 -0.32 
 
 
Table 7.  Trajectory Parameters for Ballistic 
Fallback Trajectories 
 
Case Max 
Heating 
Rate 
(W/cm2) 
Integrated 
Heating* 
(J/cm2) 
Max 
g-load 
(g’s) 
1 2.2 46.3 4.5 
2 3.9 186.9 6.4 
3 12.1 516.7 10.4 
4 36.8 1559 14.1 
5 53.4 2741.5 14.4 
6 56.6 3040.1 14.2 
7 59.3 3405.8 13.5 
8 61.5 3879.6 12.6 
9 62.2 4529.3 11.3 
10 61.8 4869.1 10.7 
11 60.8 5292.1 10.0 
12 58.9 5825.0 9.1 
13 55.7 6604.9 8.1 
14 49.4 8007.4 7.1 
* Based on a reference 1-m nose radius sphere 
 
Referring to the failure criteria shown in Fig. 6 
and explained in Sec. 3, it appears that the RTG 
would likely survive in cases 1 and 2.  In cases 3 
through 14, the failure criteria are exceeded, and 
the corresponding conditions are given in Tab. 8.  
When thrust is terminated up to a time between 
150 and 200 sec, the RTG survives and impacts 
the ocean.  When it is terminated between that 
time to a time between 540 and 560 sec MET, 
the released GPHS modules would impact the 
ocean.  Released GPHS modules would impact 
Africa when the thrust is terminated between that 
time and a time between 600 and 620 sec MET.  
For failures after that time, the spacecraft will be 
captured into orbit. 
 
Table 8.  Conditions at Failure of RTG Case in 
Fallback Trajectories 
 
Ca
se 
Time
** 
(sec) 
Altitu
de 
(km) 
Integra
ted 
Heatin
g* 
(J/cm2) 
g-
loa
d 
(gee
s) 
1 - - - - 
2 - - - - 
3 101 36.46 457.7 10.4 
4 71 58.25 663.2 4.32 
5 69 65.40 762.3 2.59 
6 69 67.90 739.8 2.03 
7 72 69.38 598.0 1.79 
8 76 72.03 770.8 1.31 
9 84 74.87 792.7 0.91 
10 88 76.80 593.4 0.70 
11 95 78.32 784.9 0.57 
12 105 80.36 794.7 0.43 
13 121 83.39 785.7 0.26 
14 158 88.36 779.0 0.11 
* Based on a reference 1-m nose radius sphere 
** Time from failure or time from entry if 
spacecraft temporarily exits atmosphere 
6. REENTRIES FOR THE MAJOR 
CONTRIBUTORS TO THE AOCs 
Although the suborbital and out-of-orbit 
reentries mentioned above are representative and 
bounding cases, they do not necessarily 
correspond to the major initiating failure 
contributors to suborbital and orbital AOCs.  
Therefore, potential failure scenarios that are 
major contributors to suborbital/orbital reentry 
AOCs which were not already included in the 
previous suborbital and orbital reentry cases 
were also examined. 
The following scenarios/launch vehicle 
configurations were investigated, where Sub# is 
a suborbital reentry and Orb# is an orbital 
reentry: 
 
Sub1:  Trajectory control malfunction occurs 
during ascent between 108.2 and 207.5 
or 286.6 and 622.1 sec.  The FTS was 
not activated, either due to its failure or 
the malfunction was undetected.  The 
outcome is a suborbital reentry before 
the Centaur second burn in an off-
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 nominal trajectory, occurring after 622 
sec where CDS is disabled, thus 
resulting in no FTS.  Reentry and 
ground impact occur before the Centaur 
second burn would have occurred.  The 
reentry configuration is the spacecraft + 
STAR 48B with all of the solid 
propellant + Centaur with liquid 
propellant for the second burn, flying 
face-on with spacecraft leading. 
Sub2: Attitude control malfunction or Centaur 
LRE catastrophic failure occurs during 
ascent between 286.6 and 622.1 sec.  
The CDS is activated late, but before 
611 sec during the Centaur first burn.  
The reentry configuration is the 
spacecraft + an almost intact STAR 48B 
with nearly all of the solid propellant, 
tumbling and no thrust. 
Sub3: Attitude control malfunction or Main 
Engine LRE catastrophic failure during 
ascent.  The CADS is activated during 
Main Engine burn before 268.6 sec.  
The reentry configuration is the 
spacecraft + an almost intact STAR 48B 
with nearly all of the solid propellant, 
tumbling and no thrust. 
Orb1: Attitude control malfunction occurs 
during the Centaur second burn between 
1732.6 and 2651.7 sec (Centaur second 
burn through space vehicle separation 
while in the parking orbit).  There is no 
FTS activation. Halfway into the 
Centaur second burn, the attitude 
control malfunction is assumed to lead 
to tumbling in the vehicle.  The onboard 
sensors detect tumble, triggering 
Centaur engine cut-off and blow-down, 
and no spin-up or ignition of the STAR 
48B.  The partial Centaur second burn 
with arbitrary attitude brings the vehicle 
into an orbital reentry.  The reentry 
configuration is the spacecraft + empty 
Centaur + STAR 48B with all of the 
solid propellant, tumbling and no thrust. 
Orb2: Centaur LRE catastrophic failure, e.g. 
an explosion, occurs while in the 
parking orbit.  There is no FTS 
activation.  The explosion is assumed to 
be isolated to the Centaur, which occurs 
halfway into the Centaur second burn, 
and the vehicle begins to tumble.  
Therefore, there is no STAR 48B spin-
up, burn, or staging.  The partial 
Centaur second burn takes the vehicle 
out of the parking orbit, and reentry 
occurs due to the decay of this elliptical 
orbit.  The reentry configuration is the 
spacecraft + STAR 48B with all of the 
solid propellant, tumbling and no thrust. 
Orb3: Attitude control malfunction or Centaur 
LRE catastrophic failure during ascent 
between 286.6 and 622.1 sec.  The CDS 
is activated between 611 and 622 sec 
during the Centaur first burn.  The 
launch vehicle has enough energy to 
capture into orbit.  Reentry occurs from 
circular orbit decay.  The reentry 
configuration is the spacecraft + an 
almost intact STAR 48B with nearly all 
of the solid propellant, tumbling and no 
thrust. 
Orb4: Centaur misaligned burn occurs while 
in the parking orbit between 1732.6 and 
2306.7 sec.  Assume the same 
misalignment in the STAR 48B burn.  
Powered orbital reentry occurs, and the 
reentry configuration is the spacecraft + 
STAR 48B burning. 
The outcomes of the above cases are given in 
Tab. 9.  Note that in the Sub3 failure scenario, 
the suborbital reentry will lead to impact in the 
ocean and is thus not simulated to expedite the 
analysis.  For the Orb4 failure scenario, refer to 
the two powered reentry cases presented in Sec. 
4.1 for the outcome of the RTG.  In all the major 
contributor cases analyzed, the RTG fails, and 
the GPHS modules are released. 
 
Table 9.  Conditions at Failure of RTG Case in 
Major Contributor Failure Scenarios 
 
Ca
se  
Tim
e 
from 
Entr
y 
(sec) 
Altit
ude 
(km) 
Integr
ated 
Heatin
g* 
(J/cm2) 
g-
load 
(gees
) 
Su
b1 
146 108.1 196 0.0 
Su
b2 
145 90.6 619 0.02 
Su
b3 
N/A
** 
N/A*
* 
N/A** N/A
** 
Or
b1 
50 84.2 626 0.22 
Or
b2 
298 101.9
7 
618 0.0 
Or
b3 
304 102.6
9 
616 0.0 
Or N/A N/A* N/A** N/A
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 Ca
se  
Tim
e 
from 
Entr
y 
(sec) 
Altit
ude 
(km) 
Integr
ated 
Heatin
g* 
(J/cm2) 
g-
load 
(gees
) 
b4 *** ** * *** 
*  Based on a reference 1-m nose radius sphere 
** Ocean impact, not analyzed 
*** See Sec 4.1 for 2 powered entry cases 
 
7. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR DAY OF 
LAUNCH 
The analysis described in the previous sections 
was used to ultimately assess the probability of 
accidental Earth reentry and the outcome of the 
RTG in support of the required nuclear safety 
assessment process.  This section will address 
the process that was developed to support on day 
of launch in the event that an in-flight failure 
actually occurred.  The main objective of this 
process was to determine the approximate most 
likely impact location of the RTG on the Earth’s 
surface, along with an associated uncertainty 
impact ellipse, within 30 minutes from receipt of 
the reentry state vector. 
It was assumed that the following Earth reentry 
state parameters would be available from range 
safety assets supporting day of launch 
operations: altitude, latitude, longitude, speed, 
flight path angle, and flight azimuth.  Entry 
ballistic coefficient of the vehicle was also 
needed to form a complete state vector set; 
however, this data was not expected to be 
available in the supplied state parameters. 
Therefore a finite list of vehicle configurations 
and attitude conditions was generated to estimate 
the most likely ballistic coefficients resulting 
from the possible in-flight failure scenarios.  
These configurations are presented in Tab. 10.  
The selection of the most likely ballistic 
coefficient would be made in real time based on 
the timing from launch when the failure scenario 
occurred. 
Table 10.  Ballistic Coefficients for Various 
Configurations 
 
Configuration* Scenario Ballistic 
Coefficient 
(kg/m2) 
Partial Star48 + 
s/c (tumbling) 
Command 
destruct during 
ascent phase 
299 
Centaur + 
Star48 + s/c 
(tumbling) 
Failure in 
Parking Orbit 
766 
Star48 + s/c 
(tumbling) 
Failure in 
Parking Orbit 
373 
s/c Only 
(tumbling) 
Failure in 
Parking Orbit 
72 
* Powered reentry was not considered due to the 
extremely low probability of occurrence. 
 
A trajectory simulation would then be performed 
starting from the supplied state vector data, 
including the derived ballistic coefficient, to 
generate a nominal impact location.  In addition, 
dispersed trajectory simulations would be run to 
generate an uncertainty impact ellipse.  The error 
sources modeled in these dispersed simulations, 
along with their values, are presented in Tab. 11.   
 
Table 11.  Impact Uncertainty Ellipse Error 
Sources 
 
Error Source Value 
Inertial Flight Path Angle +/- 0.1 degree 
Speed +/- 0.1 % 
Lift/Drag +/- 0.03 
Mass +/- 1.0 % 
Drag Coefficient +/- 10 % 
Aerodynamic Reference 
Area 
+/- 10 % 
Side Force 45 degree bank 
angle 
 
As added fidelity to the trajectory simulations, 
winds were accounted for by utilizing actual day 
of launch measured horizontal wind speeds and 
directions from the closest NOAA weather 
station to the nominal impact location.  This 
process involved taking the no wind nominal 
impact location and feeding it into a software 
program that automatically determined from the 
NOAA website the nearest NOAA weather 
station, checked the availability of wind data 
from that station (and if no wind were available, 
checked the next closest station and so on until 
wind data was available), and downloaded the 
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 wind data into a wind file as input to the 
trajectory simulation tool.   
The process was also designed to be resilient to 
computer failures that may have prevented 
detailed trajectory simulations from being 
performed in real time.  This required the pre-
generation of a trajectory database that was 
loaded onto several desktop computers that were 
available in real time if the JPL main frame 
computer went down for any reason. This 
database was generated by varying entry speed, 
flight path angle, and ballistic coefficient in an 
attempt to envelop all possible reentry scenarios.  
For each trajectory data point, a range angle was 
determined from entry to GPHS impact.  
Assuming that this range angle is somewhat 
insensitive to entry location and flight azimuth, 
an approximate impact location can be 
determined by rotating the entry position vector 
in the plane of the flight azimuth by the range 
angle as determined by a triple table lookup in 
entry speed, flight path angle, and ballistic 
coefficient.  A representative uncertainty ellipse 
would then be applied (i.e. the database did not 
account for uncertainties in simulation 
parameters).   
The entire launch contingency process as 
described above was tested through several 
launch rehearsals and was on ready status during 
the New Horizons launch operations.  
Fortunately, the launch was near perfect and the 
process was not exercised in real time. 
8. SUMMARY 
A pre-launch vehicle breakup analysis of 
potential inadvertent Earth reentry scenarios in 
the event of a launch failure was performed for 
the purpose of assessing aerospace nuclear safety 
and for launch contingency planning.  In the case 
of an orbital reentry from circular orbit decay, 
which is the most likely scenario for the orbital 
reentry AOC, the GPHS modules will be 
released during the entry.  In the majority of the 
orbital reentry cases of a steady misaligned burn, 
the GPHS modules will be released prior to 
surface impact.  After considering g-loading and 
heating, the RTG will reach the surface intact in 
only about 14.3% of the steady misaligned burn 
cases.  The RTG breakup altitudes ranged from 
20 to 112 km.  
In the analysis of ballistic fallback trajectories in 
suborbital reentries, the RTG will survive g-
loading and heating to fall back into the ocean 
for Centaur first burn thrust termination failures 
prior to a time between 150 and 200 sec MET.  
For thrust failures between that time and a time 
between 540 and 560 sec MET, the RTG is 
expected to break up and the released GPHS 
modules to fall back into the ocean.  Released 
GPHS modules would impact Africa when the 
thrust is terminated between that time and a time 
between 600 and 620 sec MET.  For launch 
vehicle failures occurring after that time, the 
vehicle consisting of the spacecraft, STAR 48B, 
and Centaur will continue into orbit. 
The failure scenarios consistent with the major 
contributors to the suborbital and orbital reentry 
AOCs were analyzed.  In all of these simulated 
suborbital (Sub1, Sub2, and Sub3) and orbital 
(Orb1, Orb2, Orb3, and Orb4) reentries, the RTG 
failed and the GPHS modules were released.  
The RTG breakup altitudes ranged from 84 to 
108 km. 
For day of launch support, a process was 
developed to provide rapid response in the event 
that an in-flight failure actually occurred.  
Through this process, the approximate most 
likely impact location of the RTG on the Earth’s 
surface would be determined, along with an 
associated uncertainty impact ellipse.  
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